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IDEOLOGY OR ISOLATIONISM'? RUSSIAN IDENTITY AND ITS INFLUENCE 
ON ORTHODOX-CATHOLIC RELATIONS 
by Catherine Clare Caridi 
Catherine Clare Caridi (Roman Catholic) has graduate degrees in both Canon Law 
(J.C.L., Catholic University of America) and Russian Studies (M.A., Georgetown 
University). She practices law and teaches in Northern Virginia. lier regular column 
on canonical questi ons can be read online at Catholic Exchange 
(www.catholicexchange.com). 
PART II: RUSSIAN IDENTITY AND ROMAN CATHOLICISM 
Introdu ct ion 
We saw in Patt I of this article (Vol. XXH, No. I, Febmary 2007) that the Russ ian 
Orthodox hierarchy are anything but enthusiastic about the modem concept of religious 
freedom as commonly enshrined in the laws of Western countries. Thei r unwillingness to 
embrace this concept stems in great part from the historical connec tion in Russia between the 
Russian identity and the Russian Orthodox Church. If being a R ussian means that one is 
Ortl1odox, how can one justifY the existence in Russia of other, non-Otthodox Christian 
churches? More importantly, how can a R ussian in good conscienc e sit idly by while non-
0Ithodox ev angelizers entice native Russians to become members of these churches? It is 
this attitude toward non-Orthodox believers that h as led the Russian Otthodox hierarchy in 
recent years to lobby actively for the passage of laws protecting Orthodoxy, by recognizing 
that historically it is the one, traditional faith of the Russian people. While other Christian 
churches have in fact been opemting on Russian soil for generat ions, Orthodox leaders assert 
that their presence in Russia was permitted solely in order that they might minister to their 
ethnically non-Russian members living within Russia . 
We also saw that the religious freedoms permitted in post-communist Russia brought 
with them an influx of foreign Christian missionaries, who actively sought to convett citizens 
of the new Russia, who had grown up in officially atheist Soviet society. Since these new 
convett� to non-Orthodox faiths are large ly ethnic Russians, the Russian Orthodox Church 
protests that they arc being pulled away from the Church of which they arc natu ral members 
by reason of their ethnicity. 
In Part II, I will focus on the activity of the Cat ho lic Church, both historically and 
currently, on Russian soil. The general concerns of Russian Orthodox leaders about 
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proselytizing among Russian citizens can be seen to be particularly applicable in their less 
than amicable auirude toward Catholicism, which is num erically the largest branch of 
Chri stianity and one t hat exists worldwide. 
The first sect ion will discuss steps taken by the Catholic Church immedia tely afteo· 
the downfall of communism in the Soviet Union, in order to assess the number of Catholics 
still liv ing in its territories and to find etlicie nt ways to minister to them. Since t he religious 
repressi ons of the communi st past had oflicially ended, Cathol ic l eaders sought to regularize 
the organization of their activities on Russi an land in accord wit h  Catholic canon law. Given 
the Orthodox Church's traditional correlation of one's religion with one's ethnicity, it should 
not be suovris ing that the actions of the Catholic hierarchy in this regard dre w swift protests 
from the Orthodox leader ship . 
In the second section, I will discuss the ecclesiological attitudes of Catholicism, 
which does not identity itself with any pao1icular racial, ethnic or other grouping, and thus 
considers its activiti es to be quite apart from any terr itorial boundaries drawn by secular 
political powers. The ideological contrast with Or tho doxy should be evident 
Lastly, I will examine the specific argument made by Russian Orthodox leaders, that 
the Catholic Church is engaged in proselytism within t he canonical territory of the Russian 
Orthodox Church. This is a charge that Catholic leaders have strenuously denied, citing the 
Catholic Church's own teachi ngs against this very activity. It will be shown that the 
argument stems in great part fi·om a disagreement a bout the definition of the term 
"proselyti sm" itself-a disagreement which in tum stems from the very different 
ecclesiological notions embraced by Orthodoxy and Catholicism, and one which cannot be 
solved merely by diplomatic negotiations and compromi se, founded as it is on the theology 
guiding each Church. Meanwhile, it appears (although no finn statistics on this point are 
availa ble) that the Orthodox hierarchy's concem may be grounded in the fact that numbers of 
ethnic Russians are, since the downfall of the Soviet Union, regularly joining the C atholic 
Church. 
I. The Impact of Russia's Current Religious Freedom Law on the Catholic Church in 
Russia 
With the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the relaxation of the harsh 
restr ictions impos ed by the coun try's fonner communist leaders, the Roman Catholic Church 
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immediately took steps to assess the damage done to Catholic institutions in Russia during 
the preceding 70 years, and to arrange to minister in an open and more stable way to those 
Catholics still living in Russia. For these purposes the Apostolic See established two 
Apostolic Administrations in Russia in 1991. Eight years later, they were re-divided into four. 
Under Catholic canon law, an apostolic administration is like a diocese, which is a 
portion of territory placed under the spiritual care and authority of a bishop (canon 368). The 
Pope can choose to set up an apostolic administration rather than a diocese in situations 
where special and serious reasons exist (usually political) that might hinder the stability of the 
operations of a regular diocese (canon 371.2). If, for example, a nation's borders are not 
settled, or if a secular govenunent in some way is regularly hindering the routine operations 
of the Catholic Church, it may not be feasible for Rome to establish a diocese(s) with set 
territorial boundaries within that particular country. Should the situation subsequently 
become more settled, canon law dictates that an apostolic administration be converted to a 
diocese, with pennanenl borders and greater stability. 
Given. the political and social upheaval taking place in the various parts of the former 
Soviet Union in 1991, with various nations rapidly (but not always predictably!) declaring 
themselves independent, it was logical for the Apostolic See initially to divide the tenit01y of 
Russia into several administrative parts without yet establishing dioceses, so as 10 enable the 
church to begin to re-form itself in Russia before making any pennanent decisions concerning 
Catholic administration there. 
And re-formation of pre-existing Catholic institutions in Russia was desperately 
needed. Many are unaware of the significant number of Catholics who continue to live in 
Russia even after two generations of communist persecution seemed close to eliminating 
Catholicism from the country entirely. "According to official Catholic statistics, there arc 
around 500,000 Catholics in Russia. This number, together with the Vatican's projection 
regarding future growth of the church, points to an additional three million people for whom 
a conversion to Catholicism would represent a retunl to the faith of their forefathers."' As 
seen in Part I of this article, the Catholic Church had been operating in imperial Russia 
already for generations before the communist revolution of 1917. Its prima1y reason for 
existence in a country of icially designated as Orthodox had been to minister to those 
Catholic foreigners, primarily Poles, who lived within Russia's borders. 
1 filatov and Vorontsova, p. I 03. A footnote in the original text notes thai "the authors cstimmc the ligurc 
to be closer to 150,000. but that is still a significant number for a church jusl recovering from oppression." 
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Yet this does not mean that all Catholics living in Russia were or arc ethnically non­
Russian. Catholic Poles, Germans, or Lithuanians living in imperial Russia naturally 
intermmTied, leading at times to the conversion of Russian spouses and/or the raising of 
Catholic children with Russian blood. And with the 1905 Edict of Toleration granting some 
measure of religious freedom, Orthodox Russians were legally free t o  convert to 
Catholicism-and, as noted in Part l, many did precisely that. This has led to an interesting 
contemporary mixture of ethnicities and religions. Shchipkov notes that currently "the 
majority of Catholics in Central Russia are Germans and Poles, though ethnic Russians 
comprise up to 40 percent. In some Siberian regions like Irkutsk, though, Catholic parishes 
are almost entirely made up of Russians. . .. Catholicism in Russia has tended to become 
russifted, and not just as a result of proselytism [a tact which] both delights and appalls the 
leadership of the Apostolic Administration, which is striving to preserve a good relationship 
with the Moscow Patriarchate."2 
Maintaining a good relationship with the Orthodox leadership has indeed proven an 
arduous task for members of the Catholic hierarchy in Russia. Virtually from the moment 
that the Catholic Church began to restore its operations in Russia in 1991, Orthodox leaders 
have accused it of setting up, in the words of Patriarch Alexei, "parallel canonical structures" 
which overlap with and reduplicate those of the Russian Orthodox Church. 
Alexei's objection stems from the notion, already discussed, that Russia is 
historically an Orthodox country, already organized into dioceses which are subdivided into 
parishes. As such it has no place for Catholic apostolic administrations and the building of 
Catholic parish churches. The Patriarch contends that the work of the Catholic Church in 
Russia since the breakup of the Soviet Union constitutes proselytism. 
And his contentions grew even more heated when, in 2002, the Vatican changed the 
status of those Russian apostolic administrations into dioceses, and officially assigned a 
bisho1> to each. Again, this move was in accord with Catholic canon law. The political 
situation in the fonner Soviet Union had been stabilized, and it became clear that the country 
of Russia had essentially settled its borders and established a more or less stable government 
system. No longer viewed as a totalitarian pariah, Russia was on its way to becoming a 
respected player in international affairs. The uncertainty of the future, which had led the 
Pope to create apostolic administrations in Russia rather than dioceses back in 1991, had been 
1 Shchipkov, in Witte, pp. 81 and 91. 
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replaced by a sufficiently consistent state of political affairs, and this led the Vatican to 
change the legal status of its administrative divisions in Russia. 
The move was a matter of procedural canon law. for Catholics, it had no particular 
theological import. few, if any, on the ground would see any visible changes in the daily 
operations of the Catholic Church in the Russian Federation. 
As a courtesy, Vatican •·epresentatives in Moscow informed the Orthodox 
Patriarchate there of this impending change several days in advance. The Vatican had also 
taken steps to avoid any appearance of creating parallel canonical structures by deliberately 
avoiding giving the new dioceses names that would be identical to Russian Orthodox ones. 
Rather than naming the dioceses after the cities where the bishops' cathedrals are located, as 
is (ypical, they were named instead after the cathedrals themselves. For example, the 
Catholic archdiocese which has its bishop in Moscow is not called the Archdiocese of 
Moscow, as would be expected, but rather the Archdiocese of the Mother of God, located at 
Moscow. The Catholic cathedral church in Moscow is named after the Mother of God. The 
other three dioceses were officially named the Diocese of St. Clement at Saratov, the Diocese 
of the Transfiguration at Novosibirsk, and the Diocese of St. Joseph at IrkutSk. 
With this diplomatic gesture, the Pope sought to avoid any appearance that he 
intended to set up administrative stmctures that would be competing with those of the 
Russian Orthodox Church. As Jesuit Father Jozef Maj, of the Pontifical Council for 
Promoting Christian Unity, later wrote in the Vatican's newspaper, "one might have hoped 
that in this procedure one might recognize not just an act of courtesy but the deep sensitivity 
which must define relations between the Chw·cbes. "3 
But the Moscow Patriarchate thought differently. After the dioceses were officially 
erected, an upcoming official meeting in Moscow with Cardinal Walter Kasper, head of the 
above-mentioned Pontifical Commission for Promoting Christian Unity and the Catholic 
counterpmt to the Orthodox Church's Kirill, was abmp tly cancelled. Patriarch Alexei had 
broken off ecumenical relations with the Catholic Church. 
Repercussions were quickly felt elsewhere as well. The Polish-born bishop of the 
new diocese in Irkutsk, Jerzy Mazur, had been operating in Russia on a one-year visa, with a 
pending request for permanent Russian residency as a prelude to Russian citizenship. 
3 "Relations of the J>an·iarchate of Moscow with the Holy See," I'Ossenotore Rom(mo, English edition, 
February 29, 2003, p. 8. While this newspaper is not technically designated as the Vatican�s oflicial mouthpiece, it 
is tacitly acknowledged that dte statements it contains do in fact accurately reflect theofficial1>osition of the Vatican. 
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Arriving back in Russia after a trip abroad within days of his diocese's official establishment, 
he was suddenly informed in the airport that his visa had been cancelled, and was promptly 
ushered back out of the country . Despite protests by the Vatican to the Russian government, 
Bishop Mazur never received a new visa and thus was unable to re-enter Russia. After 
months of operating his four million-square-mile diocese via telephone from Poland, Bishop 
Mazur was finally replaced by a new bishop who is a citizen of Russia, and Mazur himself 
was made the bishop of another diocese, in Poland. While never publicly acknowledged as 
such, it was and remains clear to all involved that the Russian govemment had acted at the 
urging of the Moscow Patriarchate, as a retaliatory gesture in response to the creation of the 
four dioceses in February 2002. 
Cardinal Kasper has, in fact, subsequently visited Russian Orthodox officials, 
including Patriarch Alexei himself, most notably in 2004 in order to rerum the Icon of Our 
Lady of Kazan, which will be discussed at length in Part Ill of this article. But for two years, 
Alexei refused to have any official, high-ranking contact with the Catholic Church, in 
continued protest of what he tenned its violation of Orthodox "canonical territory," in order 
to proselytize among Orthodox Russians-a charge strenuously denied by Catholics. 
II. Theology Underlying the Actions of the Catholic Church in Russia 
The term "Catholic" in itse lf means "universal," and the Catholic Church exists in 
virtually every country on earth. While there have been countries throughout history whose 
political leaders have declared Catholicism to be the official religion of the state, Catholicism 
does not identify itself with any particular country or nationality. Its goal is unity under a 
central authority, the Pope, who is traditionally also the Bishop of the diocese of Rome. 
One can immediately see a difference between the Catholic world outlook and that of 
Orthodoxy. As Schlafly puts it, "Rome always has had a strong missionary tradition... A key 
element in Catholic evangelization is centralized direction by the papacy," whereas in 
contrast, "The theology and practice of the Russian Orthodox Church have been quite 
different. Rejecting, likes its sister Orthodox churches, the concept of a visible juridical 
center, it looks instead to a community of faith and tradition uniting local bishops and their 
flocks.'" The historic al Orthodox notion of symphonia, the balancing of a spiritual authority 
and a secular wier within a nation, has never been embraced by the Catholic Church, which 
'Schlally, p. 682. 
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as a rule defines its local churches in territorial, not ethnic or national, ten s. When 
ministering in countries where Catholics are in the minority, the Catholic Church makes no 
distinctions concerning their ethnicity or that of the non-Catholics living in the same region. 
Consistent with its "centralized direction" as described by Schlafly above, the 
Catholic Church tends to articulate its theological positions in a public and formal manner, so 
it is possible to find its positions on various issues in its official documents. And the 
Church's authoritative teaching on ecumenical affairs was addressed directly during the 
Second Vatican Council, in its November 21, 1964, Decree on Ecumenism, Unital is 
Redintegratio. Its general attitude toward non-Catholic Christians is clearly stated: 
For men who believe in Christ and have been properly baptized are put in 
some, though imperfect, communion with the Catholic Church . ... But ... it 
remains true that all who have been justified by faith in baptism are 
incorporated into Christ; they therefore have a right to be called Christians, 
and with good reason are accepted as brothers by the children of the Catholic 
Church' 
The same document dealt specifically with the issue of relations between Catholicism and 
Orthodoxy. It should be clear that the Catholic Church officially does not seek the 
conversion of Orthodox believers to Catholicism: 
This holy Synod solemnly declares that the Churches of the East, while 
keeping in mind the necessary unity of the whole Church, have the power to 
govern themselves according to their own disciplines, since these arc bcucr 
suited to the character of their faithful and better adapted to foster the good 
of souls. The perfect observance of this traditional principle-which indeed 
has not always been observed-is a prerequisite for any restoration of union.6 
Catholic teaching on matters relevant to Russian Orthodoxy is not always so devoid 
of controversy. The Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Liberty (December 
7, 1965) conflicts directly with the Social Concept document of the Russian Orthodox Church 
on the issue of religious freedom. 
It is through his conscience that man sees and recognizes the demands of the 
divine law. He is bound to follow this conscience faithfully in all his activity 
so that he may come to God, Who is his last end. Therefore he must not be 
forced to act contrary to his conscience. Nor must he be prevented from 
acting according to his conscience, especially in religious matters .... to deny 
.$ Unitatis Redimegralio. paragraph 3. English translations ofrhis and all other Vatican H documc1HS are 
from Flannery, O.P.,Austin. ed., Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Pos1 ConciliarDocumems (Northport, NY: 
Costello Publishing Co., 1988). 
' Ibid., paragraph t 6. 
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man the free exercise of religion in society, when the just requirements of 
public order arc observed, is to do an injustice to the human person .... ' 
It should be clear that the Catholic Church's position on freedom of conscience dovetails with 
that enshrined in Russian law in the early days following the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
When Pope John Paul II protested to President Ycltsin about proposed restrictions to Russia's 
laws on religious freedom, he was not simply acting according to self-interest. His position 
accurately reflected the teachings of Cad1olicism on the subject. 
If the Catholic Church asserts that all should have freedom to seek the true faith, how 
does that affect its position on missionmy activity in lands whose inhabitants already follow 
other Christian, but non-Catholic beliefs? Vatican Il's Decree on the Church's Missionary 
Activity was issued on the same day as the Declaration on Religious Liberty, and makes it 
clear that its definition of"mission" dcftnitely docs not pertain to other baptized Christians: 
The special undertakings in which preachers of the Gospel, sent by the 
Church, and going into the whole world, cany out the work of preaching the 
Gospel and implanting the Church among people who do not yet believe in 
Christ, are generally called "missions." ... a tremendous missionary work still 
remains to be done. There are two billion people-and their number is 
increasing day by day-who have never, or barely, heard the Gospel 
8 message .... 
It is evident that such a description of missionary activity could never be applied to Orthodox 
believers, who have been baptized and who practice a Christian faith. There is no way that 
such official Catholic teachings can reasonably be construed to permit, let alone encourage, 
its members to attempt to pull Russian Orthodox Christians away from their faid1 and into the 
Catholic Church. 
Catholic missionary activity is also addressed in the official Catechism of the 
Catholic Church, published in 1994. While the Catechism postdates the Council documents 
cited above by three decades, it is clear that there has been no shift in the Catholic Church's 
position: "the missionary task implies a respecifitl dialogue with those who do not yet accept 
the Gospel. Believers ... proclaim the Good News to those who do not know it .. .'"' 
When applied to the Catholic Church's activity in Russia, we can perhaps get a better 
idea of precisely how Russian Catholic leaders are to view their role. They minister to those 
who were already Catholic long before the breakup of the Soviet Union permitted them to 
1 Declaration on Religious Liberty Dignitatis llumanae. pnrngraph 3. 
11 Dec.ree Ot'l the Church's Missionary Activity Ad GenJes Divinitus, paragraphs S & 10 . 
., r)aragraph 856 (emphasis in original). 
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practice their faith freely and openly. They welcome anyone who, professing no faith, 
expresses interest in Catholicism. 
One might expect that they also welcome any Orthodox believers who sincerely wish 
to become Catholics. Surprisingly, perhaps, this is not the case. As Catholic Archbishop 
Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz in Moscow stated publicly, "I always repeat, that for me Russia was, 
is, and will remain an Orthodox land. In Russia ... conversion from 01thodoxy to Catholicism 
is a rare occurrence. And 1 ant against such conversions. "10 
This is not simply the personal  opinion of the Archbishop. In 1992 the Vatican's 
Pontifical Commission for Russia published its principles and norms for evangelization in the 
territories of the fonner Soviet Union. The Commission stated unequivocally that "in full 
respect for religious freedom, which is an inalienable right of every person, bishops and 
priests will take care to consider attentively the motives of those who ask to enter the 
Catholic Church. Such people must also be made aware of their obligations toward their own 
commun ity of origin" (1, 3).'' Church hierarchs operating in these territories are to "take care 
to ensure that no activity undertaken within their ecclesiastical circumscriptions can be easily 
misconstrued as a 'parallel structure of evangelization"' (II, 2), which could be perceived as 
competing with existing Orthodox stnicttires in the same territOiy. 
Once again, this position is not merely an example of Vatican diplomacy. It 
accurately reflects the teachings of the Catholic Church concerning ecumenical relations with 
other Christians, and conceming missionary activity. 
III. The Question of Proselyt ism and of Definition of the Term 
During the roughly two years that Patriarch Alexei refused to meet with Catholic 
leaders, his official position was that the Catholic Church must first cease to proselytize 
among the Russian people. Members of the Catholic hierarchy, in response, insisted that no 
proselytizing was taking place, and that Catholic institutions operating in Russia were 
ministering to tbe spiritual needs of those Russians who were already Catholic. While they 
welcomed any interested persons of no faith at all�f whom there are many in Russia today, 
after 70 yeai'S of official atheism-Catholics were not actively seeking to conve11 01thodox 
believers. Moscow's Catholic Archbishop Kondmsiewicz repeatedly requested that the 
"Quoted in Schtatly, p. 688. 
11 "Genernl Pl'illciples and Practical Norms for Coordinating the Evangelizing Ac.tivity and Ecumenical 
Commitmellt of the Catholic Church in Russia aod in the Other Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent 
S1a1es." English trnnslaiion published in Origins 22117 (OcL 8, 1992): 301·304. 
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Moscow Patriarchate provide specific examples of this alleged proselytism, so that they could 
be addressed and corrected where necessary. 
On June 25, 2002, Patriarch Alexei released a document in which he provided details 
in support of his allegations, and addressed the repeated denials of Catholic officials that they 
were engaging in proselytis m . 
The problem of proselytism is aggravated b y  the fact that the Catholic side denies tlatly its 
very existence, referring to its own interpretation of the term 'proselytism' as enticement of 
people from one Christian community to another through 'dishonest' means (for instance, 
bribery). At the same time, it alludes to the preaching of the Gospel to 'non-believers and 
non-baptized' people who come to Catholic churches exercising their freedom to choose a 
religion that suits them. . ..Catholics reject the veoy notion of caoonical territory .. . Catholic 
clergy ... come to a country with a millennium-old Christian culture imbued with the 
Orthodox tradition .... it has been evident for a long time that the object of the Catholic 
mission in Russia and other CIS countries is the traditionally Orthodox population ... they 
cannot be called non-believers or atheists to a man .... " 
It is evident that the Patriarch is not so much focusing on the Catholic Church's 
ministering in the former Soviet Union to those who were already Catholic. Rather, his chief 
concern is that other Russians, who may have been raised with no faith during the communist 
period, are joining the Catholic Church. And as has been seen above, this conflicts with the 
Orthodox notion that those who arc ethnically Russian are supposed to be Orthodox 
believers, as Orthodoxy is pan of the Russian identity . 
Cardinal Kasper had, several months previously, published an essay in the Italian 
Jesuit joumal Civilta Callolica." pondering the current state of relations with Moscow. 
There he also addressed the notion of proselytism, pointing out that the Catholic ChUI'ch itself 
is also currently dealing with "new sects" which are evangelizing among traditionally 
Catholic people in Latin America, adding, "unlike the sects, all the so-called historic 
Churches are agreed in their rejection of proselytism, understood in its original sense: they 
are unanimous in their claim that it is wrong to work for the Gospel by illicit means . .. .  
Because the Catholic Church recognizes the Orthodox Churches as true Churches and their 
sacraments as true sacraments . .. it is entirely inappropriate to undertake missionary activity 
among the Orthodox faithful ."" 
Clearly Kasper is here discussing the notion of proselytism using a definition that is 
much narrower than that of Alexei. When Kasper and other Catholic leaders insist that the 
"English translation ao www.katolsk.no/nyheoct/2002107/08-000I .htm. 
'' Civil!il Cauo/ica, 2002 1: 531-541 (March 16, 2002). 
'" lbid. (This and the quotation on the following page are my ln:tnshltions). 
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Church is not engaging in proselytism in Russia, they mean that there is no attempt being 
made actively to convert Orthodox Russians away from Orthodoxy. Receiving into the 
Catholic faith those Russians who either profess a non-Christian faith or no faith at all, 
however, is not considered to be proselytism. Such persons are always welcome in the 
Catholic Church, which, as noted earlier, perceives its mission to bring all souls to Christ as 
over and above any tetTitorial limitations. 
We can see here a fundamental disagreement over the correct usage of the term 
"proselytism," that is gro unded in two very different ecclesiological frameworks. The 
Moscow Patriarch holds that any Russian who is not Christian should be converted, but 
converted to Orthodoxy, the historical religion of Russia. Catholicism, in contrast, makes no 
distinctions as to an individual's ethnic or national identity, seeking to bring any and all 
persons to Christianity. Thus Orthodox officials are able to provide evidence that Catholics 
are proselytizing in Russia, according to the Orthodox definition of the term; while Catholics 
are equally able to deny that they engage in proselytism, according to their own 
understanding of what the word means. 
A question might here be raised: if the Russian Orthodox Church desires all Russian 
non-believers to embrace Orthodoxy, why are Russians converting, in numbers that are 
apparently significant enoug h  to alarm the Moscow Patriarchate, to Catholicism rather than to 
Orthodoxy? 
In his essay, Cardinal Kasper raised the possibility that "the Orthodox Church is 
conscious of its own pastoral and evangelizing weakness , and therefore fears a Catholic 
presence that is basically more effective at the pastoral level, even if it is small numerically." 
Alexei responded directly to this suggestion in his July document, noting that 
one can state confidently enough that the successes of the Catholics in Russia 
have been indirectly conditioned by the influence of Orthodoxy on the life of 
the Russians .... It is this predisposition of our people, who were wearied with 
longing for faith during years of state atheism, rather than the effectiveness 
of the Catholic 'pastoral level' in Russia, that accounts for the relative 
success of not only Catholic, but any preaching of Christ.'; 
Metropolitan Kirill had, some years earlier, given an indication of the way the Russian 
Orthodox Church leadership had expected other Christians to react to the downfall of 
communism in the Soviet Union. lnstead of entering the territoty to evangelize it themselves, 
15 Sec note 61. 
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they should have proffered assistance to the Orthodox, so that they could have re­
Christianized Russia on their own: 
We expected that with the coming of religious freedom ... other Christians 
would support us in a new, no less difficult situation, ffi the Russian 
Orthodox Church suddenly found itself before a door wide open to the 
broadest possible religious freedom and a huge field for missionary work. 
We sincerely hoped that we would be supported in this task. Our hopes, 
however, were not fulfilled'• 
Are huge numbers of Russians becoming Catholics, because of the presence now of Catholic 
institutions throughout the country? Obtaining accurate statistics on genuine conversions is 
hampered by the fact that there are Russians entering the Catholic Church now whose 
families had already been Catholics in the imperial era. It could be argued that such persons 
are not actually convening to Catholicism, but are returning to the faith which they would 
have been practicing all along, had communist persecution not hindered Catholic parishes 
from operating freely. 
Additionally, however, scholars Filatov and Vorontsova observe that there is 
currently a sort of intellectual movement among some of the Russian intelligentsia, that is 
leading many of them to embrace Catholicism irrespective of the increased visibility of 
Catholic charitable institutions on Russian soil: 
The increased participation in contemporary Russian Catholicism cannot be 
explained in terms of the missionary activity of the church, for it is 
negligible. Rather, ... there is a natural, spontaneous attraction w Cmholicism 
among certain sections of Russian society . ... the majority of parishioners are 
young, mainly students and members of the intelligentsia . ... The generally 
high level of education among the parishioners ... gives Catholicism greater 
influence and appeal. ... Catholics are, as a rule, well-educated with a Western 
outlook; for many of them the concepts of culture and freedom are linked 
primarily with the Catholic Church." 
It appears that there is more here at work than simply the efforts (alleged or real) of Catholics 
in Russia to  attract Russians to the Church. Given that Russian law-even with the 
restrictions imposed in 1997 at the urging of the Orthodox leadership-permits Russians to 
embrace any or no faith in accord with the dictates of conscience, there will evidently be 
some conversions to Catholicism among educated Russians regardless of whether or not 
proselytizing is truly taking place. 
•• Kirill, '·Gospel and Culture," p. 73. 
"filatov and Vorontsova, p. 104. 
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